Understanding the Language of “Person” in the Trinity
Introduction
The Westminster Confession of Faith states in chapter 2.3:
“In the unity of the Godhead there be three persons, of one substance, power, and eternity; God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Ghost. The Father is of none, neither begotten nor proceeding.”
This formulation stands at the heart of classical Christian confession, yet it also raises one of the most persistent conceptual difficulties in Trinitarian theology: the meaning of the term person. In contemporary usage, the word is typically understood in psychological categories. A person is thought of as an individual center of consciousness, defined by self-awareness, mental continuity, and independent agency. When such assumptions are uncritically applied to Trinitarian doctrine, the result is often confusion, leading either to tritheism, in which the divine persons are treated as three independent subjects, or to modalism, in which personal distinctions are reduced to roles or manifestations. The Westminster Confession, however, does not employ the language of person in this modern sense. Rather, it inherits a technical metaphysical usage shaped by patristic and medieval theology and received into the Reformed orthodox tradition. The Confession presupposes a distinction between person and nature, grounds divine unity in the identity of essence, and locates personal distinction not in consciousness, will, or operation, but in eternal relations of origin.
This essay argues that the language of “person” in the Westminster Confession of Faith 2.3 must be understood classically rather than psychologically. A divine person is not an independent center of consciousness or will, but a subsistent relation of the one, simple divine essence, eternally distinguished by relations of origin. By first clearing away modern misconceptions and then positively articulating the classical account presupposed by the Confession, we are able to see how the Westminster divines affirm real personal distinction while uncompromisingly preserving divine unity, simplicity, and equality.
The Modern Misunderstanding of Personhood
The language of person as employed by the Westminster Confession of Faith in its description of the Trinity differs significantly from the way the term is commonly used today. In contemporary thought, a person is typically understood as a center of consciousness, possessing its own distinct mind, awareness, self-knowledge, perspective, and will. On this account, personhood is functionally determined by cognitive and volitional operations. If a being can know and will independently, it is regarded as a person. Accordingly, modern definitions often ground personhood in consciousness rather than in nature. By consciousness, we mean the awareness of oneself, one’s acts, and objects external to oneself. Under this framework, a being qualifies as a person only insofar as it is actively conscious. However, this approach proves unstable. Consciousness fluctuates. A sleeping person, an infant, or a mentally impaired individual may lack active self-awareness at a given moment, yet none thereby ceases to be a person. This exposes a fundamental weakness in the modern account which is that it mistakes an operation for a ground of being.
Consciousness is not a substance. It does not exist independently. Rather, it is an operation that presupposes a nature capable of knowing and willing. To ground personhood in consciousness is therefore to confuse what a thing does with what a thing is. Because operations come and go while personhood remains, personhood cannot be grounded in consciousness. The modern definition is thus insufficient even at the level of anthropology. This insufficiency becomes especially problematic when applied to the doctrine of the Trinity. If personhood is defined as an independent center of consciousness, then each person of the Trinity must possess his own distinct mind and will. The result is not the one God confessed by the Westminster Confession, but three divine subjects coordinated in agreement. Such a model inevitably collapses into tritheism and stands in direct contradiction to the confession’s insistence on one substance, power, and eternity.
The Classical Definition of Person
To properly understand the language of the Westminster Confession, we must therefore appeal to the classical definition of person. According to this usage, a person is defined as the subsistence of a rational nature. By subsistence, we mean that a person exists in itself, not as an accident, property, or part of something else. A person is not a faculty, an activity, or a nature floating freely. Rather, person answers the question of who exists. By rational nature, we mean a nature endowed essentially with intellect and will, not as accidental features but as intrinsic powers. On this account, consciousness presupposes nature as an operation presupposes its principle, while personhood presupposes nature as that which it subsists in. This distinction is crucial. It explains why infants and the mentally impaired are fully persons despite lacking developed consciousness, and it provides the necessary conceptual framework for understanding the Trinity. Because the divine persons share one and the same divine nature, they do not possess distinct consciousnesses or wills. Their unity is not merely moral or functional, but ontological.
What Is a Divine Person?
The definition of a person as “the subsistence of a rational nature” works rather straightforwardly when we are speaking about human beings. According to Berkhof, “Experience teaches that where you have a person, you also have a distinct individual essence. Every person is a distinct and separate individual, in whom human nature is individualized.” As such, each human person subsists in his own instance of human nature. Consequently, where there are multiple human persons, there are multiple human natures. These natures are not different in kind; they are specifically identical. Yet they are numerically distinct. Peter’s humanity is not Paul’s humanity, even though both are fully and truly human.
The case is different, however, when we turn to the persons of the Godhead. Berkhof goes on to say that, “But in God there are no three individuals alongside of, and separate from, one another, but only personal self-distinctions within the Divine essence, which is not only generically, but also numerically, one.” This means that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit do not each subsist in a distinct instance of the divine nature. Rather, they subsist in the one, numerically identical divine essence. This leads to an important contrast which is that in creatures, personhood multiplies nature; in God, personhood does not multiply the divine essence. For this reason, while the classical definition of personhood remains sound, the definition of a divine person requires greater precision. A divine person is a subsistent relation of the divine essence. By subsistent, we mean that the relation exists in itself and not as an accident, part, or property added to something else. By relation, we mean an ordered reference of one to another. And by of the divine essence, we mean that each divine person is identical with the one, simple, and undivided divine being.
It is in this sense that the Westminster Confession states, “In the unity of the Godhead there be three persons, of one substance, power, and eternity.” The confession is not speaking of unity in a loose or colloquial sense, as though the persons were merely united by agreement or cooperation, as some social Trinitarian models suggest. Rather, it is speaking of unity of being. The three persons are united because they subsist in one and the same divine essence, which each person wholly and indivisibly is. Each person of the Godhead is fully God, yet, at the same time, God is not God apart from the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. God is not divided among the persons, nor does the divine essence exist independently of them. Any attempt to separate the persons from one another, or to imagine them as possessing portions of the divine essence, undermines the doctrine of divine simplicity. For this reason, the divine essence is wholly present in each person, such that none is greater or lesser than another in being, power, or eternity. This is precisely why it is essential to define the divine persons as subsisting relations of the divine essence. If the divine essence were conceived as something shared or distributed among the persons, the result would inevitably be some form of subordination within the Godhead. The Westminster Confession avoids this error by employing subsistence language rather than possessive language. A divine person is not something that has the divine nature; rather, a divine person subsists as the divine nature. The person does not take up the nature as one might put on a garment, as though person and nature were separable realities. Whereas a created nature is instantiated by only one person at a time, the one divine essence eternally subsists as three persons without division, multiplication, or inequality.
Consequently, the divine persons are not distinguished by differing personalities or centers of consciousness, as modern psychological definitions of personhood often assume. The confession directs us instead to the metaphysical core of personhood. The three persons share the same divine consciousness, will, intelligence, and power. This does not mean that the persons possess independent faculties that simply coincide in agreement. Rather, all divine operations flow from the one divine nature. Because willing belongs to nature rather than to person, and because the divine essence is one, the will of the Father is numerically identical with the will of the Son and the Spirit. Louis Berkhof puts it rightly by stating that, “the divine nature is indivisible and therefore identical in the persons of the Godhead. It is numerically one and the same, and therefore the unity of the essence in the persons is a numerical unity. From this it follows that the divine essence is not an independent existence alongside of the three persons. It has no existence outside of and apart from the three persons. If it did, there would be no true unity, but a division that would lead into tetratheism.”
This is why the classical definition of personhood provides a more coherent account of the Trinity than modern psychological models. If consciousness were grounded in person rather than in nature, the result would be multiple wills within the Godhead and, ultimately, the collapse of monotheism. Therefore, if all absolute attributes are identical with the divine essence, the question presses itself upon us: what, then, distinguishes the persons of the Godhead?
Relations of Origin: How Divine Persons Are Distinguished
The concept of relation is central to understanding how divine personhood differs from human personhood. A relation, strictly speaking, is neither a thing nor a quality. It does not describe what something is, but how one stands with respect to another. For example, father to son, son from father, employer to employee, teacher to student. Relations, therefore, concern ordered reference rather than essence.
In created beings, relations are accidental. They are added to an already existing substance and may change without altering what the thing is. I am human prior to becoming a father or an employee, and I remain human whether or not I stand in those relations. Such relations neither constitute my being nor define my nature. They describe me only in reference to others. In God, however, relations are not accidental. Because God is simple and immutable, nothing can be added to or removed from His being. There is no composition in God by which relations could inhere as properties alongside the divine essence. For this reason, the relations in God are identical with the divine essence according to being, while remaining really distinct according to relation. Each divine person is fully and wholly God, possessing the entire divine essence, yet each is personally distinct. This distinction does not arise from essence or operation, but from relations that subsist personally and eternally in the one undivided divine being. It is in this sense that we say the relations subsist.
Not every relation distinguishes the divine persons. Only relations of origin do so. The persons of the Godhead are not distinguished by attributes, powers, will, or operation, all of which belong to the divine essence and are therefore common to each person. Rather, each person is distinguished by an eternal relation of origin that exists in itself and does not imply temporal beginning, causation, or inequality. Thus, the Father is unbegotten, the Son is begotten of the Father, and the Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son. These relations are eternal, not successive, and they distinguish the persons personally without dividing the divine essence. Berkhof says that “There is a certain order in the ontological Trinity. In personal subsistence the Father is first, the Son second, and the Holy Spirit third. It need hardly be said that this order does not pertain to any priority of time or of essential dignity, but only to the logical order of derivation… generation and procession take place within the Divine Being, and imply a certain subordination as to the manner of personal subsistence, but no subordination as far as the possession of the divine essence is concerned.”
It is in this light that Hodge in his commentary of the WCF insists that “the titles, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are not the names of the same person in different relations, but of different persons.” These titles are not functional names assumed by a single divine person under varying circumstances. They are proper names that signify real, eternal personal distinctions. If Father, Son, and Spirit were merely relational titles for one person, then the Father would not truly beget the Son, nor would the Spirit truly proceed from the Father and the Son. The Trinity would collapse into one person appearing under different modes. The Confession explicitly rejects this by naming God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Ghost, thereby affirming three distinct persons who eternally subsist in the one divine essence. This distinction does not imply separation or inequality. The divine persons are coequal precisely because they are of one substance, power, and eternity. Each possesses the fullness of the divine essence. The relations of origin distinguish the persons personally, not essentially. As such, they do not introduce hierarchy, dependence, or gradation within the Godhead. The Father is not more God than the Son, nor is the Spirit less divine than either. The order expressed in their relations is an order of personal subsistence, not of being.
The Westminster Confession makes this clear when it states: “The Father is of none, neither begotten nor proceeding; the Son is eternally begotten of the Father; the Holy Ghost eternally proceeding from the Father and the Son.” These statements do not describe temporal acts but eternal truths about how the one divine essence exists personally. The Father is eternally Father, the Son eternally Son, and the Spirit eternally Spirit. There was never a moment when any of the divine persons was not, for their relations of origin are rooted in eternity itself. Thus, while the divine essence is one and indivisible, it subsists eternally in three distinct persons. The attributes of God belong to the essence and are therefore common to all three persons. The personal properties, by contrast, are the subsisting relations of origin by which the persons are distinguished from one another. These relations neither divide the essence nor compromise divine simplicity. They account for real personal distinction while preserving the unity, equality, and perfection of the one true God.
Scriptural Basis for Understanding the Language of “Persons”
Scripture does not provide a formal metaphysical definition of the term person. Instead, it presents us with a pattern of divine self-disclosure that requires careful theological articulation. The classical language of personhood is not imposed upon Scripture as a foreign framework; rather, it arises from the necessity of holding together what Scripture itself reveals without contradiction. The biblical witness compels us to affirm both the absolute unity of God and the real distinction between the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. First, Scripture clearly affirms real personal distinction within the Godhead. The Father, Son, and Spirit are not presented as a single subject appearing under different names or roles, but as distinct subjects who stand in relation to one another. The Father sends the Son into the world (John 3:16; Gal. 4:4). The Son speaks to and prays to the Father (John 17:1–5). The Spirit is sent by the Father and the Son and bears witness to the Son (John 14:26; 15:26). These are not instances of self-reference or dramatic role-shifting. They presuppose real distinction without implying separation.
This distinction is further reinforced by Scripture’s presentation of the Father, Son, and Spirit as acting simultaneously. At the baptism of Christ, the Son is baptized, the Spirit descends upon Him, and the Father speaks from heaven (Matt. 3:16–17). The three are present at once, ruling out any understanding of the Trinity as one person appearing successively under different modes. Scripture does not allow us to collapse the persons into a single subject with changing relations. At the same time, Scripture is equally emphatic that there is only one God. The consistent testimony of both the Old and New Testaments is uncompromisingly monotheistic. “The LORD our God, the LORD is one” (Deut. 6:4). “I am the LORD, and there is no other” (Isa. 45:5). This means that whatever personal distinction exists within the Godhead cannot imply a division of essence or a plurality of gods. The biblical data will not allow us to affirm three beings, three substances, or three divine essences.
Yet Scripture also attributes full deity to each of the three persons. The Father is universally acknowledged as God. The Son is identified as God in the strongest possible terms: “the Word was God” (John 1:1); “in Him the whole fullness of deity dwells bodily” (Col. 2:9); and Thomas’s confession, “My Lord and my God” (John 20:28). The Holy Spirit is likewise identified as God: to lie to the Spirit is to lie to God (Acts 5:3–4), and the Spirit searches even the depths of God Himself (1 Cor. 2:10–11). Scripture therefore forces us to confess that each person is fully and truly God, not partially divine or derivatively divine. Scripture does not distinguish the divine persons by essence, power, or operation. The Father does not possess more deity than the Son, nor does the Spirit exercise a lesser divine power. Instead, Scripture consistently distinguishes the persons relationally. The Son is the Son of the Father (John 1:14, 18). The Father is the Father of the Son (Ps. 2:7; Heb. 1:5). The Spirit is said to proceed from the Father and to be sent by the Son (John 15:26; 16:7). These distinctions are not grounded in temporal actions or economic roles but in the eternal relations by which the persons are personally ordered to one another.
Moreover, Scripture does not present the Father, Son, and Spirit as possessing independent divine wills. While the Son obeys the Father in the economy of redemption, this obedience does not imply a separate divine will competing with another. Rather, Scripture presents divine willing as unified: “I and the Father are one” (John 10:30); “The Son can do nothing of His own accord, but only what He sees the Father doing” (John 5:19). These texts do not suggest two wills in negotiation, but one divine will expressed personally and inseparably. This supports the classical claim that will belongs to nature rather than to person as an independent center of consciousness.
Taken together, the biblical witness requires a framework in which the Father, Son, and Spirit are truly distinct, fully divine, eternally related, and inseparably one. Scripture denies that the persons are distinguished by essence, attributes, or power, while simultaneously denying that they are merely one person acting under different names. The classical language of personhood arises precisely at this point. By confessing the divine persons as subsisting relations of the one divine essence, the Church seeks to confess faithfully what Scripture reveals: one God, three persons, equal in glory, undivided in being, and eternally distinguished by relations of origin.
Conclusion
The language of “person” in Westminster Confession of Faith 2.3 must be understood within the classical metaphysical framework it presupposes. The Confession does not speak of persons as independent centers of consciousness or will, but as distinct modes of subsistence of the one, simple divine essence. By grounding personal distinction in eternal relations of origin rather than in psychological independence, the Confession safeguards both the unity of God and the real distinction of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.
Thus, when the Westminster Confession declares that “in the unity of the Godhead there be three persons,” it confesses that the one divine essence eternally subsists as three distinct persons, equal in glory, undivided in being, and distinguished solely by their relations of origin. Properly understood, the language of person functions not as a psychological description, but as a metaphysical confession of the triune God revealed in Scripture
References
Louis Berkhof, Systematic Theology (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1938), 91–98.
A. A. Hodge, Commentary on the Westminster Confession of Faith (Edinburgh: Banner of Truth Trust, 1958), 69–74.
